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BAAN COMPANY’S CORPORATE WEB STRATEGY –  
AN EFFORT TO REACH MAIN STREET 
 
Henk A. Post and Harry R. Commandeur (February 2004) 
 
For several decades, the information technology industry is characterized by a high degree of 
innovation, accelerating change and turbulence. New products take the lead. Standards 
disappear and market dominance fades away. Under these circumstances companies can 
evolve fast.   
 
During the 1990s Baan Company1 became a global vendor of enterprise applications, called 
ERP systems.2 With a strong technology drive this firm strove for competence building right 
from the start. Its mission was to become an independent software manufacturer, serving a 
global market. The company was successful in leveraging its competences (Post 1997a). 
Modularity and componentization of its product architecture became a characteristic feature in 
developing and implementing Baan’s competence-based strategy (Post 1997b). One of the 
elements of this strategy was the firm’s software implementation competences (Post 1997c). 
In general, competition increasingly takes on the character of a contest to identify, create, and 
leverage new competences. This requires changing both the knowledge base within a firm and 
the way the firm uses its existing knowledge to compete more effectively and to retain or 
improve its competitive position (Sanchez and Heene 1996). To leverage its existing and to 
build new competences, Baan developed its Baan Web strategy in the years 1996-1998 which 
implied a far-reaching renewal of its corporate strategy. 
 
Burgelman and Grove  (1996) define the moment of choosing a new strategy as a strategic 
inflection point (SIP). To analyse and discuss the Baan Web strategy we exploit their 
framework named ‘Dynamic Forces in Firm Evolution.’ Our paper is an extension to their 
work. The case we examine is an example of not only a success but also a failure. And we 
discuss some additional aspects of a theoretical nature. As a result of that we formulate the 
management implications. Our extension compared to Burgelman and Grove comprises a 
discussion of: 
1. the concept of ‘dynamic capabilities’ as introduced by Teece et al. (1997) instead of 
‘distinctive competences’ used by Burgelman and Grove 
2. the impact of the process of standardisation – the circumstance that the development 
and execution of a new corporate strategy takes place in a ‘winner takes most’ 
business 
3. the high relevance of determination of the business domain and of defining the focus. 
 
From bowling alley to main street 
 
To explain the industry situation, we make use of the insights of Moore (1995) about “the 
landscape of the technology adoption life cycle” and “value disciplines and the life cycle”. 
Since 1994, Baan found itself in the bowling alley. This is a period of niche-based adoption in 
advance of the general marketplace. The phase between this one and the main street phase is 
the tornado, a phase of mass-market adoption when the general marketplace switches over to 
the new infrastructure paradigm. 
 
Insert figure 1: Value Disciplines and the Life Cycle (1995: 176) 
 
 1
The period 1990-1993 can be identified as the early market. The customers were the early 
adopters among enterprises. Baan Company accomplished going through the chasm phase in 
1993-1994. The customers helped Baan to cross the chasm and to reach the bowling alley. An 
example was Boeing Aircraft Corporation that concluded in 1994 an agreement with Baan 
Company to implement the biggest ERP system up to now. In 2003 it consisted of more than 
40,000 users. Baan developed a vertical market approach, driven by compelling customer 
needs – such as those of Boeing in the aerospace market segment. Characteristic for Baan’s 
strategy was striving for product leadership and working on customer intimacy. Definitely, in 
specific market segments the company was a product leader. As a result, at the end of the first 
half of the 1990s Baan had built up a strong competitive position.  
 
In the beginning of 1996 Baan’s Board concluded that the mainstream market was not easy 
yet with the available ERP solutions. The top management of Baan decided to aim at reaching 
the main street. Industry analysts expected that the market of enterprise applications would 
grow from 1.049 million seats (= users) in 1995 to 12.730 million seats in 2000. To capture 
this market opportunity, the company defined a new corporate strategy in 1996. Particularly 
the huge market of medium-sized companies had not yet adopted the new generation of 
enterprise information systems. The reason was that the available ERP products were much 
too costly and the implementation of it needed considerable resources from service providers. 
The mid-market was waiting for an attractive offer. This required severe changes in product 
packaging, distribution model, services model, and pricing model. A period of unparalleled 
growth was open to Baan if it was able to catch the opportunity of the mid-market.  
 
The corporate strategy had to change substantially however. As Moore explains, the forces 
that operate in the bowling alley argue for a niche-based strategy that is highly customer-
centric. Those in the tornado push in the opposite direction toward a mass-market strategy for 
deploying a common standard technology and product package. Essential for the tornado 
period is operational excellence. At that moment Baan had the reputation of a visionary 
company that was not so strong in execution. 
 
The challenge of alignment beyond the strategic inflection point 
 
In an extremely dynamic industry, it is a real challenge to clearly perceive the winning 
strategy, or new technological regime, which looms beyond a SIP. A company that changes 
its official corporate strategy should align again corporate strategy and strategic action. If the 
alignment process fails a company is confronted with manifestations of strategic dissonance. 
Burgelman and Grove develop a framework that gives an explanation of how corporate 
strategy and strategic action are related to each other. 
 
Insert figure 2: Dynamic Forces in Firm Evolution (Burgelman and Grove 1996) 
 
This framework consists of five dynamic forces that shape a company’s evolution and the 
alignment of strategic action with corporate strategy. The first force is the company’s official 
corporate strategy that reflects top management’s beliefs about the basis of the firm’s current 
success and anticipated changes in the familiar environment. The second force – strategic 
action – is what the company actually does.  The third of the five forces – the basis of 
competitive advantage in the industry – is determined by the industry factors identified by 
Michael Porter (1980) as key determinants of the attractiveness of an industry: the bargaining 
power of customers and suppliers, the nature of the rivalry among incumbents, and the threat 
of new entrants and of substitution. Technological change, legislation, or government 
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regulation can affect each of these elements and their relative importance. The fourth force 
involves the company’s distinctive competences: the competences that have made it possible 
to develop a competitive advantage and to survive. Finally, the fifth force concerns the 
company’s internal selection environment that mediates the link between corporate strategy 
and strategic action and the link between distinctive competence and the basis of competitive 
advantage. Especially, it is the role of the internal selection environment to achieve alignment 
between the dynamic forces of a firm’s evolution. It regulates the allocation of the company’s 
scarce resources – cash, competences and capabilities, and senior management attention – to 
strategic action. The internal selection environment comprises administrative elements (e.g., 
resource allocation rules) and cultural elements (e.g., norms governing internal 
communication). It is recognized in the management accounting and control functions and 
procedures.  
 
Baan’s new corporate strategy: the Baan Web strategy 
 
Baan’s new corporate strategy to pass the tornado and to achieve main street consisted of 
several sub-strategies, a ‘business web’ strategy, a ‘beyond ERP,’ and a mid-market 
distribution strategy. As, in the phase of the strategic action, all strategies were included in the 
first one, we name the new corporate strategy the Baan Web strategy. It implied several far-
reaching changes. The company made the choice to replace the existing technological regime 
– the ERP footprint – by a new one – the extended enterprise footprint, called ‘beyond ERP.’ 
To achieve this expansion of the technology platform and product offering Baan would 
develop and implement an acquisition and partnership strategy – with partnerships in the field 
of technology, software applications, marketing and distribution, and implementation 
services. To achieve leadership in the mid-market a mixed channel strategy would become 
highly important. A variety of indirect channels of independent distributors would have to 
guarantee an effective worldwide marketing and sales process and system implementation 
process.  
 
An essential element of the new corporate strategy was the business web. The concept was 
developed by the Board assisted by McKinsey consultants serving Baan. These advisers were 
inspired by authors as Brian Mc Arthur and Hagel.3 It was expected that extending and 
intensifying Baan’s business web would strengthen its competitive position and accelerate the 
growth. Expansion of the web would make the company more attractive for customers and 
partners. For customers, because it would mean a reduction of the risk of making a wrong 
choice. If the number of installed software products would increase, the Baan Web would 
become more allure to technology and software development partners. As a result, customers 
would be attracted by a broader product offering, which would eventually lead to additional 
sales. Et cetera.4 The shaper of the platform of the Baan Web was Baan by its ownership of 
the core technology and core applications. The co-shaper of the web by developing 
complementary technology products and applications was Vanenburg. This enterprise 
positioned itself as the growth accelerator. Baan and Vanenburg had a common owner, a 
foundation of the Baan family, named Oikonómos. The elements of the Baan Web were, in 
addition to Baan Company and Vanenburg, the customers, technology partners, application 
development partners, distribution partners and services partners.  
 
It is essential for a web that partners collaborate on a shared platform: architecture, 
tools, applications and brand name. If a partner joins the platform, it enters a growth 
cycle. At the same time, the platform is reinforced. Revenues will increase and the 
web will become more attractive to existing and new partners as well as customers. 
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As a result, the share of the web-builder in the web revenues will reduce. In 1996, 
Baan’s revenues were more than $400 million and the Web around it had total 
revenues of approximately $800 million. A year later, Baan’s revenues increased to 
almost $700 million, and that of the Web partners to more than $1,300 million. In 
January 1998, the president of Vanenburg, Sharman, announced: ‘our goal is to 
reduce our own share in the total value of worldwide Baan installations to about 20 
percent.’5 For 2000, Baan’s aim was $2 billion revenues for the company itself, and 
between $8 and $10 billion for the Baan Web partners.  
 
‘Beyond ERP’ 
 
From 1996 on, Baan developed a strategy that was called ‘beyond ERP.’ The company 
wanted to extend its product offering across the ERP footprint. A first step was extending 
ERP to the complete value chain by integrating SCM (Supply Chain Management). With the 
in 1996 acquired software company Berclain, Baan entered this field of SCM.  
 
A next step of extending ERP to the complete value chain was by integrating CIS (Customer 
Interaction Software), later called CRM (Customer Relationship Management).  Baan 
acquired two firms. Together they became the front-office division of Baan. The take-overs 
placed Baan ahead of its ERP competitors. The intention was to integrate ERP systems with 
CIS. From the end of 1997 Baan would release this new type of products.  
 
BOX: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE TORNADO: BAAN INSIDE 
 
Industry watchers and analysts were positive on Baan’s new strategy. For example, 
February 1998, the prominent American analyst Cowen & Company published an 
analysis about Baan with a ‘strong buy rating with a target price of $52 (55 x 1999 
EPS of $ 0.95).’ As one of the key points it mentioned: ‘Venture activity in 
Vanenburg is building the Baan Web around Baan Company.’ They further 
explained:  
 
‘Seeing powerful leverage of Vanenburg – 40% of Baan is held in a foundation (Oikonómos) 
that funds Vanenburg, a broad set of activities that benefit the company and the stock. 
Activities from Vanenburg have been targeted to recruit and train new employees around the 
world, build new business process models for the DEM (the implementation product suite 
Orgware), kick start the mid-market channel worldwide, and to create (>40) VARs (value 
added resellers). The investments are clearly aimed at growing the Baan Web, Baan’s family 
of partners. These investments are supposed to make a profit for Vanenburg over a delineated 
time frame, much like venture capital. Whether or not the returns to Vanenburg are 
competitive, Baan is surely gaining strategic advantage from activities that don’t appear on 
the company’s financial statements.’  
 
In 1998, Tom Tinsley, then CEO of Baan Company, wrote a memo to the leadership team 
about the positive impact of the Baan Web. He explained that Baan was aiming at reaching 
‘Main Street’ (Moore, 1995):  
 
‘Our philosophy has been for some time that there are between about 55 and 65 million seats 
available in the market for us to go after and anywhere from sixty to seventy percent of those 
seats are economically available to us by going to an indirect channel. So we began initiatives 
twelve, eighteen months ago with Baan Business Systems and beyond that we now have 
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created Baan Midmarket Solutions which will effectively be the arm of the Baan group that 
offers the Baan product into our indirect channel partners. (BMS was owned by Vanenburg 
(80%) and Baan Company (20%), authors). As we expand the technology footprint we are 
also expanding the way customers can receive the product whether it comes through a direct 
sales process or through an indirect channel partner or through a service bureau offering.’  
 
Serious crisis 
 
In the last quarter of 1998, Baan Company faced a serious financial and management crisis. 
An early indication of this crisis came when the figures of the first quarter of 1998 were 
postponed because of adopting changed accounting directives of the American stock market 
supervisor SEC. It was no longer allowed to include the sale of products that had not yet been 
invoiced to a customer but only to a distributor. That put pressure on Baan’s profit. Then the 
second quarter figures were disappointing as well. In addition, Baan was criticized by 
American securities houses for its accounting behavior. In their view, the extent to which the 
listed company Baan and Vanenburg were interwoven was not acceptable. Analysts doubted 
whether the money flows between the various elements in the Baan Web were transparent 
enough. Claims were made about conflict of interest and insider trading between the public 
and the private Baan businesses. To provide the desired clarity, founder Jan Baan and his 
brother Paul retired in July 1998 from the operational and supervisory management of Baan 
Company. Jan gave up his position of chairman, Paul his position of chairman of the 
supervisory board. October 1998, CEO Tinsley had to issue a profit warning. As far as the 
investors were concerned, the statement issued by Baan got a cold reception. The company 
blamed the overall economic situation in the world as well as the millennium, which was said 
to cause companies to refrain from investing in software. Baan’s share price dropped by 30%. 
And this was by no means the end of the company’s troubles. That same month, Baan 
announced a large-scale reorganization. About 20% of the jobs had to disappear and a 
considerable number of offices would be closed. Losses over 1998 totaled $315 million. The 
Baan Web strategy was broken off. 
 
END OF BOX 
 
To pass the tornado phase Moore mentions two criteria: 1.) product leadership and 2.) 
operational excellence. Based on these criteria we can conclude that the Baan Web strategy 
was broken off by the end of 1998 because of missing both characteristics. The Board was not 
able to restructure the company in a sustainable way when the demand for ERP decreased in 
1998. Baan was far from operational excellence. During 1999 and 2000 it became clear that 
Baan had lost its product leadership too. Rapid growth was crucial for Baan to pass the 
tornado phase. The danger is that growth will overstretch corporate resources and lead to 
insufficient customer support. This happened to Baan (Hochberg 2000). 
 
Analysis of Baan’s dynamic forces 
 
1. Official corporate strategy 
 
The official strategy was to develop the business web, to extend the ERP footprint and to 
become number one in the mid-market.  
 
The evolution of the Baan Web was quite successful. Between 1996 and 1998, Baan acquired 
a large number of companies and entered into a broad variety of strategic alliances. Its partner 
 5
Vanenburg set up a large variety of businesses. The revenues of the web were growing fast in 
1996 and 1997. The web strategy was broken off as a result of four causes. First, the founder 
Jan Baan lost the confidence of the shareholders and the Board of Baan in 1998. As a 
consequence he left the Board of Baan and joined his brother Paul in giving leadership to 
Vanenburg. Baan and Vanenburg were no longer close partners. Second, a result of the drop 
in Baan’s stock price was that Vanenburg was nearly bankrupt by the end of 1998. It had 
invested heavily in start-ups, financed with bank loans. Baan shares were the pledge. The 
banks started selling these shares in October 1998 after the stock crashed. Vanenburg had to 
downsize its activities dramatically. So Baan lost its key partner in a period that it could not 
afford this. Third, Baan aimed at extending the ERP footprint. With that it was visionary and 
early. However, extending the footprint was not a competitive advantage at that time. On the 
contrary, it confused the market and weakened the position in each of the separate markets of 
ERP, SCM and CRM. Fourth, in the late second half of the ‘90s, several new players entered 
the mid-market with an ERP product. Compared with Baan, these products had a poor 
functionality but their price/performance ratio was attractive for medium-sized companies. 
Baan’s strategy to extend the ERP footprint and to target the high-end of the market conflicted 
with the strategy to conquer the mid-market. Until mid-1998 the take-off phase of the web 
strategy was a well-going process. It was stopped not because of competitive actions or 
changing market circumstances but Baan’s own inability of execution.  
 
2. Strategic action 
 
The business web came into existence quite successfully. This was the only prosperous 
element of the Baan Web strategy. The company’s top management failed to integrate the 
acquisitions and as a result activities were spread out thin. The company did not deliver what 
it had announced, and thus damaged its credibility in the market. Developing the technology 
to realize an integration of ERP, SCM and CRM took much more time than expected. It was 
not available before the end of 1999, and that was too late. 
 
Baan’s decision to enter the mid-market through partners and product bundles was 
challenging. But in practice there was often channel conflict between Baan and its distribution 
partners, even between Baan and Vanenburg. Also, Baan made serious mistakes in the way 
that it structured its financial relationship with its master distributor. In 1998, Baan had to 
restructure its relationships with other companies in its channel and restate the revenues it had 
previously declared. 
 
Baan was not successful in offering an attractive product for the mid-market. An important 
reason was that Baan did not change its business model. It still focused on the large 
customers, both from a marketing and distribution as from a product development 
perspective. The company did not develop the competences to successfully attack the mid-
market competitors and did not develop the right product and services offering.  
 
3. Basis of competitive advantage in the industry 
 
Baan reached the bowling alley because of its dedication to manufacturing companies in 
specific vertical markets. Moving to main stream it lost this focus. In targeting the Fortune 
500 market segment it was in a weak position to SAP because it had no good finance 
application and because it did not have a strong relation with consulting firms as Arthur 
Andersen which introduced SAP to their clients. 
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In the mid-market there was no market leader yet. By the end of the 1990s Microsoft would 
enter this market by acquiring some young players. Baan had a reasonable chance to become 
the market leader if it had aimed on that. Developing the distinctive competences for 
competitive advantage, the choice of the mid-market conflicted with both ‘beyond ERP’ and 
‘beating SAP.’ 
 
4. Distinctive competence of the company 
 
By the mid-1990s Baan was the market leader in several vertical markets. The Baan Web 
strategy implied that the company broadened its product offering and lost its market 
leadership in specific markets. The effort to develop the competences to extend the ERP 
footprint conflicted with that to build up the distinctive competences for the mid-market. In 
the end the company failed at both fronts. 
 
When the Baan Web strategy fell through, strategic dissonance was larger than ever in Baan’s 
history. In general, the most fundamental source of strategic dissonance derives from a 
divergence between the changing basis of competition in the industry and the firm’s 
distinctive competences, the latter becoming less relevant for competitive advantage 
(Burgelman and Grove 1996). At Baan, it was just the other way around. Baan destroyed its 
distinctive competences in its effort to change the competitive game. It lost a major part of its 
product leadership because of its acquisition strategy and failing integration efforts. 
Moreover, it had deprived of its lean organization and its entrepreneurial spirit. The top 
management of Baan failed to match dynamically firm-level distinctive competences and the 
basis of competition in the ERP industry. The company was not able to deliver in time the 
products that it promised the market. It was not a matter of being too late with developing the 
competences but of becoming an unreliable business partner. 
 
5. The crucial contribution of the internal selection environment 
 
As a company moves through a strategic inflection point, according to Burgelman and Grove, 
the old and the new basis of competition, the old and the new distinctive competence, the old 
and the new strategy, and the old and new strategic action are all in play together. Seeing, 
imagining, and sensing the new shape of the company is only one step. Getting there requires 
more wrenching actions. These moves, the strategic actions, involve (re)assigning resources 
in order to pursue the new strategic intent. Baan’s top management did not accomplish this 
process. We agree with this statement of Burgelman and Grove: ‘Clearly, the wisdom 
necessary to guide a company through transformational changes cannot, as a practical matter, 
reside only in the head of the CEO. If it did, he or she would have guided the company 
through those changes in the first place.’ Moreover they state: ‘If, on the other hand, the CEO 
comes from the outside, chances are he or she does not really understand the evolving 
subtleties in such situations.’  
 
In the face of a SIP, a company’s internal selection environment is important (Burgelman 
1991). Its role is a two-directional one. Its share is to regulate the allocation of the company’s 
scarce resources to strategic action. The other aspect is that the internal selection processes 
lead up to the formulation of new strategic goals. However, this critically depends on top 
management’s strategic recognition capacity. A crucial type of this involves top 
management’s ability to recognize the strategic importance of actions by middle-level 
managers that tie a new business initiative to the corporate strategy or that injure the 
execution of the corporate strategy. Obviously, the strategic recognition of Baan’s top 
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management failed. After the launch of Baan’s web strategy the internal selection processes 
did not succeed in reformulating the strategic goals in a way that the concord between the five 
forces was restored. What could have been the reason for that? We touch on some issues. 
 
The top management team 
 
Right from the start of the year 1996, Baan Company got a new president and COO (chief 
operating officer), Tom Tinsley. When he joined Baan, he had worked at McKinsey for 18 
years, recently as a managing partner. As a consultant he had served EDS and Compaq. He 
had no experience in the role of an executive. Exactly two years later, he was appointed as 
CEO (chief operating officer) while the founder Jan Baan held the position of chairman. The 
founder resigned from that position July 1998, and from that moment Tinsley was president, 
CEO and chairman. He was the deviser of the Baan Web strategy.  
 
Another crucial role was that of the chief financial officer (CFO). Baan was confronted with 
the leaving of two CFOs in the years 1996-1997. With respect to designing and implementing 
the administrative rules and norms the CFO was an influential executive. After that, the CFO 
role was fulfilled by an executive with a general management background who was at the 
same time COO. We suppose that these changes did not have a positive influence on the 
reporting and budgeting capability. 
 
Baan’s CEO introduced in 1997 a new go-to-market strategy which was criticized fearfully 
internally because it created a complicated organization structure with double or even three-
double reporting lines. If we may believe the critics, this organization structure hindered the 
execution of the corporate strategy and contributed to a poor strategic alignment. It influenced 
the communications between top and middle management in a negative way. 
 
From 1995 Baan had dual headquarters in the Netherlands and the U.S. When Jan Baan was 
succeeded by Tom Tinsley as CEO Tinsley strengthened the American influence in Baan’s 
top management. However, Tom Tinsley’s office was located in the Netherlands just as Jan 
Baan’s. This was until 1998. Then he moved to the U.S. and expanded the staff at the 
American headquarters considerably. In the Netherlands this evolution was experienced as an 
americanization of the company. 
 
‘The Dynamic Forces in Firm Evolution’ framework suggests that there is never one reason to 
detect when a new corporate strategy fails. The authors of this paper think that Baan’s official 
corporate strategy was an ambitious and risky one. Developing and implementing the strategy 
the company was dominated by a top-down force. What Baan was missing was that the top-
down force and the bottom-up force were both strong at the same time. Especially, the 
contribution of the middle management was missing in aligning strategy and action. This case 
stresses the vital influence of middle management in successful execution of a strategy. As a 
result of the failing alignment process, the execution of the strategy failed. Apparently, Baan 
lost the balance between both forces in the second half of the 1990s. Especially in high-
technology industries it is desirable that both forces are strong at the same time because of the 
multitude of uncertainties. Baan weakened its capability of making – and accepting – clear 
decisions that the entire organization was capable and/or willing of supporting. 
 
Baan’s poor performance in aligning strategic intent and strategic action in the years 1996 to 
1998 certainly had to do with the corporate identity and management style built up throughout 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. It was a pioneering organization. The transformation 
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in the second half of the 1990s to an organization with a professional management style and a 
global organizational structure was not achieved satisfyingly. An important reason was that 
the emphasis on license revenues in combination with high market growth suppressed sound 
business principles. (Licenses have an extremely high contribution margin of more than 90 
%.) Moreover, the top management changed the corporate strategy too fast and too far-
reaching, at least in a way that stretched beyond what the company was capable of doing. The 
ambitious strategy of the company’s leadership team required the development of new 
innovative and managerial capabilities while at the same time the demands of the industry and 
the shareholders required major changes of the organization to achieve sustainability. The 
company could not do both and its strategic goals thus created enormous, top-driven 
dissonance within the organization. 
 
At the moment that Baan’s technology and software products would have become an 
undisputed standard, the web strategy would have succeeded and Baan would have passed the 
strategic inflection point. Mid-1998 Baan’s market position was not far from that. To build up 
the web, a cycle of increasing returns had been started that was feasible for continuation. The 
growth of the total web revenues in that period illustrates the initial success of the strategy.  
 
Baan Company executed quite an aggressive acquisition strategy to contribute to it. Next to 
this it concluded a large number of alliances agreements in the fields of technology and 
product development and of system distribution and implementation. In collaboration with 
Baan, Vanenburg had the role of making available the remaining important components to 
realize a distinctive competitive advantage. This all worked out fairly well. 
 
Points of attention for theory 
 
In the context of the framework of Burgelman and Grove applied in high-tech markets we ask 
attention for three issues of a theoretical nature. 
 
1. Dynamic capabilities 
 
Teece et al. (1997) give a concise and insightful explanation of several strands of strategic 
management. The structure-conduct-performance paradigm emphasizes the action a firm can 
take to create defensible positions against competitive forces. If it does not possess the 
requisite assets it can buy these. The process involves nothing more than choosing rationally 
among a well-defined set of investment alternatives.  
 
From the resource-based perspective firms are heterogeneous with respect to their resources 
and capabilities. Business development is viewed as an extremely complex process. Firms 
lack the organizational capacity to develop new competences quickly. The ability to achieve 
new forms of competitive advantage is called by Teece et al. ‘dynamic capabilities.’ Dynamic 
capabilities are the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments – given path dependencies and market 
positions (Teece 1997: 516). This approach places emphasis on the internal processes that a 
firm utilizes, as well as how the capabilities/competences are deployed and how they will 
evolve (1997: 529). 
 
Teece et al. stipulate that competences/capabilities are embedded in distinct ways of 
coordinating processes and combining resources. This may explain how and why seemingly 
minor technological changes can have devastating impacts on a firm’s capabilities to compete. 
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Productive systems display high interdependency. Organizational and managerial processes 
shaped by a firm’s asset positions and molded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths, 
explain the essence of the firm’s dynamic capabilities and its competitive advantage (Teece 
1997: 518). By ‘paths’ they refer to the strategic alternatives available to a firm, and attendant 
path dependencies. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of 
increasing returns to adoption exist. 
 
2. Standardisation 
 
Baan’s web strategy was based on the belief of ‘a winner takes most’ business. Essential for 
this type of business is the increasing returns mechanism which results in a process of 
standardisation. A firm that controls a technology that becomes established as a standard can 
have an extremely profitable market position (Besen and Farrell 1994). A standard is a 
technology or product that the majority of users in a specific market have adopted. A standard 
is not only valuable for the vendor but also for customers. It reduces the risk of buying a 
product that is not adopted by the market and as a consequence has a short life cycle (Katz 
and Shapiro 1986, Shapiro and Varian 1999). Important to note is that the availability of 
complementary components may have a strong influence on potential customers to become a 
participant of the web and adopt the technology and the product of the web shaper. This 
availability is crucial for becoming a standard. To be a market leader with a superior product 
is not only important for the firm itself and its customers. It has its impact on the competitors. 
They have to play a subordinate role as a consequence of the market leader’s dominance and 
they have to adapt themselves.  
 
Standardisation belongs to the basis of competitive advantage and thus to the third of the five 
forces in the framework of Burgelman and Grove. It emphasizes the actions a firm can take to 
create defensible positions against its competition. If a certain product becomes a standard 
this has severe impact on competitors. It raises the entry barrier. For the market leader the 
intensity of rivalry decreases but for the remaining players it increases. For example, Baan’s 
acquiring of a number of companies belongs to this. This is true because they took over 
potential competitors, but also because they prevented these acquisitions by other ERP 
vendors. 
 
3. Business domain 
 
Baan was operating in a turbulent environment in the 1990s. In such an environment, better 
performance will result if an organisation’s business definition is narrowly defined. A narrow 
business domain definition can best leverage the company’s technological competences 
(Sidhu, Nijssen and Commandeur 2000). This suggests that Baan’s performance would 
decrease when enlarging its business domain. The factual results from 1998 on confirm this. 
 
Baan’s change of corporate strategy into the Baan Web strategy implied a redefinition of its 
business domain. The company’s business domain was quite narrowly defined using its 
internally developed technological competences as the reference point for such a definition. 
With the change of the corporate strategy the company’s business domain was defined more 
broadly using the underlying customer needs being served as the reference point for such a 
definition. This was the need of an extended enterprise information system. Teece (1997) 
stresses that focus needs to be defined in terms of distinctive competences or capability, not 
products. Products are the manifestation of competences. 
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Management implications 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion of theory and analysis of the Baan Web strategy we 
formulate the next conclusions and guidelines. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A major source of strategic dissonance is a divergence between a firm’s changing basis of 
competition in the industry and a firm’s distinctive competences, the latter becoming less 
relevant for competitive advantage. In 1996, Baan was confronted with such a situation. In the 
high-end market Baan had focused on, the limits to growth became visible. The company had 
to find new growth opportunities. Dynamically matching firm-level distinctive competences 
and a changing basis of competition is a tough management challenge.  
 
A second major source of strategic dissonance originates in the divergence between corporate 
strategy and strategic action. Inertia in corporate strategy will lead to change that is too slow. 
However, in many other cases, top management changes the corporate strategy too fast – in 
ways that stretch beyond what the company is capable of doing or the market is ready to 
accept. As a consequence, the new corporate strategy will create top-driven dissonance within 
the organization. The latter was true to Baan. 
 
The top management must formulate new strategic intent based on strategic recognition. A 
company is in the need of leadership to develop a new roadmap for the firm that makes sense 
and that is feasible in the eyes of the internal stakeholders, as well as the external ones. Baan’s 
leadership team did formulate a new strategic intent and developed a new corporate strategy. 
It failed in the execution of it. The effective functioning of the internal selection environment 
is really crucial in passing the strategic inflection point. In the face of a SIP, a company’s 
internal selection environment is even more important for survival than its stated strategy. The 
reason of this is that the role of the internal selection environment is to regulate the allocation 
of the company’s scarce resources and to deploy and redeploy these assets under changing 
market conditions.  
 
The implementation of a new strategy is viewed by some as driven by the strategic intent of 
the CEO who sets ambitious targets, relentlessly develops the firm’s capabilities and 
transforms the basis of competition in the industry to the firm’s advantage. In practice, it 
doesn’t work in this way however. Extensive communications between top and middle 
management are required. Top management has to respect and to appraise the opinions and 
insights of middle management while at the same time guiding the alignment processes. 
 
If a company is dominated by the top-down force, there is a chance that it will efficiently 
march in lockstep toward an important strategic intent. Especially under highly turbulent 
circumstances, it is of utmost importance that the top management carefully balances the top-
down and the bottom-up forces. The knowledge and experience of middle management is 
indispensable to developing a sustainable corporate strategy. The top management has to 
encourage the internal debate in that phase. After closing the debate it has to make clear 
decisions which the entire organization is capable of executing. At this point, Baan’s top 
management fell through. It failed to listen carefully and to take the necessary decisions. For 
example, the go-to-market structure introduced in 1998 was criticized fiercely by middle 
management. Moreover it did not enable the making of sound business decisions. It is crucial 
for top management to have a communication and reporting structure in place that meets its 
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own needs but also the needs of middle management. This structure facilitates the crucial 
balance between top-down and bottom-up forces in the organization. 
 
A comparison of the competitive forces approach (third of Burgelman’s five dynamic forces 
in firm evolution) and the distinctive competences approach (fourth of the five forces) may be 
revealing for the failure of the Baan Web approach. From the first perspective, the process of 
identifying and developing the requisite assets is not particularly problematic. From the 
distinctive competence perspective, this is more complicated. Resource endowments are 
‘sticky:’ at least in the short run, firms are to some degree stuck with what they have and may 
have to live with what they lack. Teece et al. (1997) state that generally distinctive 
competences and capabilities cannot be acquired, but must be built. This is contrary to the 
acquisition and partnership strategy Baan implemented in the years 1996-1998. 
 
Baan did a number of acquisitions with as the official reason to acquire new competences. 
Firm-specific capabilities (or competences) can be sources of advantage. The history of Baan 
from about 1996 on suggests that the Board adhered to shareholder value and to the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm. They did not align the third force with the fourth force of the 
framework and did not balance these two forces. It is the dynamic capabilities approach 
(Teece et al. 1997) that studies how combinations of competences and resources can be 
developed, deployed, and protected. It stresses the importance of exploiting existing internal 
and external firm-specific competences to address changing environments. Developing 
distinctive competences was undoubtedly a capability of the founder Jan Baan. His successor 
in the position of CEO made an important contribution to Baan’s potential future success by 
focussing on the basis of competitive advantage in Baan’s industry. However, the analysis 
suggests that this element of the corporate strategy got to much weight and that the alignment 
with the competencies perspective failed. Perhaps, it was even a conflict between 
perspectives, between the perspective that economic rents are monopoly rents and that rents 
accrue to the owners of scarce firm-specific resources. 
 
The analysis of the Baan Web strategy suggests that the path dependencies were favourable to 
successfully executing a strategy of building new distinctive competences to become a market 
leader. The top management executing the Baan Web strategy did not realize the path 
dependencies, at least not satisfactorily. It was responsible for internal and external 
integration and sourcing. Differences in coordinative routines and capabilities have a 
significant impact on performance variables as development costs and development lead 
times. Systems-level or architectural innovations often require new routines to integrate and 
coordinate engineering tasks. The failure of Baan to introduce new technologies can thus be 
seen as a consequence of the mismatch that so often exists between the set of organizational 
processes needed to support the conventional product offering and the requirements of the 
new (Teece 1997).  Baan was not able to achieve the required organizational reengineering. 
The company was also in the need to reconfigure the firm’s asset structure and to accomplish 
an internal transformation. The top management of Baan missed these dynamic capabilities 
when executing the Baan Web strategy. 
 
Baan did a number of acquisitions in the years 1996 to 1998. It extended its ERP footprint as 
a result but it lost its distinctive competence of focus on specific verticals also. The company 
was not able to accomplish the integration between the original company and the acquisitions 
to develop the product package that fulfilled the promise of ‘beyond ERP’ and that would 
gain Baan the desired strong competitive position. After the acquisition phase Baan Company 
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became a conglomerate of more or less related companies with their own specific go-to-
market approach. 
 
In the period preceding the execution of the Baan Web strategy the company was highly 
innovative and a first mover in product development in several important respects. The Web 
strategy had a strong impact on the R&D performance. Too many and partly conflicting 
challenges resulted in destroying this distinctive competence from Baan. 
 
The mid-market strategy conflicted with the strategy that had made Baan successful. Baan 
had always been innovative and able to serve specific customers. It wanted to continue this 
approach while at the same time offering a product for the mid-market. The company did not 
abandon its old strategy but wanted to do both. As a result the company was not able to 
launch a successful mid-market solution. 
 
The founder Jan Baan was a born entrepreneur. When he left the Board in 1998, the company 
lost a vital competence. His successor as CEO was not able to get in place the good 
procedures and a business development team to absorb this mislaying. The company did a lot 
of announcements – internally and externally – which were never implemented. For a 
sustainable business it is crucial to fulfil the promises the company is doing and to give an 
effective follow-up to its announcements. 
 
The relevant competitive boundaries or business domain issue is extremely important. 
Differences in the conceptualization of a firm’s competitive boundaries before and after 
developing and implementing a new strategy have a strong influence on the strategic choices 
made, and definitely on its fortune. A relatively narrow business domain definition based on 
an organizational’s technological competences leads to better performance in the early phases 
of the technology adoption life cycle. Baan gave up its original business domain with the 
Baan Web strategy. 
 
Moore (1995) clarifies with his ‘landscape of the technology adoption life cycle’ that the 
value disciplines change in the life cycle. Important in the phase of the early market is just 
product leadership. In the bowling alley the success depends on product leadership and 
customer intimacy. In the next phase, the tornado, crucial are product leadership and 
operational excellence. In main street the value disciplines are operational excellence and 
customer intimacy. The industry analyst Gartner Group uses two dimensions to judge the 
software vendors. These are completeness of vision – more or less comparable with product 
leadership – and ability to execute – more or less comparable with operational excellence. 
Baan was strong on the first dimension and comparatively weak on the second one (see figure 
4). The primary reason that the company failed passing the tornado phase, was that it was 
missing operational excellence. It was really crucial, it was part of the official strategy, but the 
management did not achieve the execution of it. 
 
A related issue is whether a company is able to change from value disciplines going through 
the phases of an adoption life cycle. The capabilities that result in product leadership are 
completely different from those that result in a combination of operational excellence and 
customer intimacy. The necessary changes in value disciplines imply transformations of the 
capabilities. Baan had to make this transformation process within a period of five to seven 
years. The risk of failure of it is high. This could be reason for the management of a company 
to decide not to enter the tornado phase and to strive for reaching main street but to start again 
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to develop a product for the early market and to sell the product and the customer base to 
another company that has experience in serving a mass-market. 
 
To summarize, the Baan Web strategy is a case of the challenge to pass the strategic inflection 
point in a highly turbulent industry. We can learn of it the necessity of alignment between the 
five forces in firm evolution. This case gives an in-depth insight in the effort to be 
accomplished to travel the journey from the early market via the chasm and the tornado phase 
to the main street. Here a company will meet undoubtedly a new strategic inflection point. 
 
Guidelines 
 
In a situation of a strategic inflection point the top management has the primary responsibility 
for a new corporate strategy. Our guidelines are: 
 
1. 
Successful development and implementation of a new corporate strategy is a process of 
aligning the five dynamic forces of firm evolution. Pay careful attention to the internal 
selection environment that is the crucial force in the continuing alignment processes that have 
to take place. The execution of a strategy requires that the internal selection environment 
functions in a proper way. It has to facilitate the alignment processes on the two axes – 
corporate strategy / strategic action and basis of competitive advantage in the industry / 
distinctive competences. 
 
2. 
Develop a new strategy balancing top-down and bottom-up forces. Be aware of the crucial 
role of middle management. Maintain or develop clear communication lines. Make sure that 
decisions made by top management are executed by middle management. 
 
3. 
Changing a corporate culture may be a requirement for a successful execution of a new 
corporate strategy. This may be a risky objective however, because it influences the 
functioning of the internal selection environment. Do not change the corporate culture when 
the distinctive competences and the critical success factors are in change already. 
 
4. 
Every company has its own dynamic capabilities which result in a specific competitive 
advantage. Be aware that new distinctive competences are not for sale but have to be 
developed based on existent competences. A company has a unique combination of distinctive 
competences. Changes in it will only work if they improve the competitive advantage. 
Building up a new set of distinctive competences can harm existent competences. If you don’t 
want this, develop another approach. 
 
5. 
The personalities and the capabilities of the members of the top management are really vital 
for successful development and execution of the corporate strategy. A balance is required 
between entrepreneurship and management and between cognitive and hands-on capabilities. 
Extensive experience of the business is indispensable too. 
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6. 
The business domain choice has a strong impact on the profitability of the firm. Define a 
narrow focus and accept/reject business opportunities dependent of conformity with this 
definition. When redefining the business domain, take care of not loosing focus. This will 
weaken the competitive position. Define a focus in terms of competences or capabilities rather 
than in terms of products. Primarily the capabilities are crucial for success in the marketplace. 
 
7. 
Passing the phases of the technology adoption life cycle requires changing the value 
disciplines. If you are not willing or able to implement such a change process, do not enter a 
next phase but start again with the phase that fits the best. 
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An important internal document source has been formed by several series of power point 
slides used for leadership meetings and for meetings with analysts and investment bankers. 
 
An important external information source has been formed by articles in the financial press. 
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